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ABSTRACT This paper proposes a novel solution, called a decentralized, efficient, privacy-preserving,
and selective aggregation (DEP2SA) scheme, designed to support secure and user privacy-preserving data
collection in the advanced metering infrastructure. DEP2SA is more efficient and applicable in real-life
deployment, as compared with the state of the art, by adopting and adapting a number of key technologies:
1) it uses a multi-recipient system model, making it more applicable to a liberalized electricity market; 2) it
uses the homomorphic Paillier encryption and selective aggregation methods to protect users’ consumption
data against both external and internal attacks, thus making it more secure; 3) it aggregates data at the
gateways that are closest to the data originator, thus saving bandwidth and reducing the risk of creating a
performance bottleneck in the system; and 4) it uses short signature and batch signature verification methods
to further reduce computational and communication overheads imposed on aggregating nodes. The scheme
has been analyzed in terms of security, computational, and communication overheads, and the results show
that it is more secure, efficient, and scalable than related schemes.
INDEX TERMS Smart grid, AMI, security, homomorphic encryption, privacy preserving, selective
aggregation, data leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid (SG) is a next generation electrical grid
that, as shown in Fig. 1, supports two-way electricity
flows and communications among grid entities [1]. One com-
ponent of SG is the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
that ensures communications for meter applications. AMI
may also connect users with other entities via users’ smart
meters (SMs) using a hierarchical network structure consist-
ing of building area networks (BANs), neighborhood area
networks (NANs) and wide area networks (WANs).
One anticipated application of AMI is the automated meter
reading [1], in which each SM measures its user’s electricity
consumption data (CD) during a short time slot and sends the
CD to authorized entities. Having access to users’ CDs for
each time slot will allow grid operators manage the grid more
efficiently and suppliers forecast their customers’ demand for
electricity more accurately. As a result, the grid’s reliability
and efficiency can be improved. The more fine-grained the
CDs sent to entities are, the more the SG reliability and
efficiency may be improved (without considering the extra
costs incurred as the result of the additional processing/
communication).
However, uncontrolled access to fine-grained CDs may put
users’ privacy at risk. Entities that have access to CDs may,
for example, use non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) tech-
niques [2] to build individual users’ electricity consumption
patterns, breaching users’ privacy. The more fine-grained the
CDs, the greater the risks, as far as the users’ privacy is
concerned. Thus, it is important to protect users’ CDs from
unauthorized access while collecting the data.
One way to achieve this is to aggregate users’ CDs for
each time slot before making the data available to authorized
entities, assuming that the aggregated CD (ACD) obtained
in each slot provides sufficient information to the entities.
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FIGURE 1. A conceptual architecture of SG.
Also, intermediate nodes that aggregate the data should not
be allowed to access the CDs. This can be achieved by using
a homomorphic encryption technique [3]. Such a technique
allows intermediate nodes to perform a specific linear
algebraic operation on ciphertexts, which is equivalent
to a different operation conducted on the corresponding
plaintexts.
There are schemes [4]–[15] published in literature, which
are designed to secure data aggregations and collections, but
they assume that there is only a single recipient of ACD of all
the users. In other words, these schemes are designed based
on a single-recipient system model. However, in a liberal-
ized electricity market (which is deployed in most European
countries) there are multiple entities (e.g., grid operators,
suppliers) that are authorized to access ACDs of different
sets of users for legitimate purposes, and these access should
be granted in conformance to the least privilege principle.
Clearly, the existing schemes are not designed for a
liberalized electricity market, and more work is necessary to
allow a migration from the single-recipient system model to
a multi-recipient one.
One naïve approach to realize this migration is to allow
a ‘prime’ authorized entity (one which obtains the aggre-
gated data in a single-recipient system model) to share the
aggregated data with other ‘secondary’ authorized entities.
However, this approach has two main drawbacks: (1) the
prime entity knows the aggregated data of each subset of users
requested by each of the secondary entities (and this might
not be desirable in a liberalized market) and (2) the secondary
entities can not verify the correctness of the aggregated data,
i.e., they can not verify that the data they receive from the
prime entity is in fact the aggregated data of the requested
subset of users.
One way to overcome these drawbacks would be to apply
one of the existing solutions multiple times, i.e., to encrypt a
user’s CD multiple times, each time using a different autho-
rized entity’s homomorphic public key, generating multiple
ciphertexts, one for each of the authorized entities. Then,
the ciphertexts from different users that are intended for
the same entity are aggregated and the result is sent to that
entity. Thereby, all the authorized entities will only receive
the ACD of the users under their managements. However,
this naïve solution is not efficient as each SM will need to
encrypt the same data multiple times to generate multiple
ciphertexts. Therefore, there is a need for a new aggregation
method that could serve the multi-recipient system model
with less computational and communication overheads.
In addition, considering the large number of SMs anticipated,
having a single entity to perform the aggregation would place
excessive computational burden on it, thus making the entity
a potential performance bottleneck and an easy target for
attacks. Hence, it is desirable to distribute the computational
load of data aggregation across multiple entities, and the
selection of these entities should be such that any additional
communication costs introduced are minimal.
This paper proposes such a novel solution called a
decentralized, efficient and privacy-preserving selective
aggregation (DEP2SA) scheme. DEP2SA supports aggrega-
tion of CDs in respective users’ suppliers and locations, so
authorized entities can only get the fine-grained ACDs rele-
vant to, and necessary for, their respective business dealings.
In this way, users’ privacy can better be preserved. Further-
more, DEP2SA allows grid operators (prime entities) to share
their respective aggregated data with suppliers (the secondary
entities) in such a way that the suppliers could verify the
correctness of the received data with the assistance of a
trusted entity. This work extends our previous research [16]
in improving the aggregation method and proposing a method
to quantify the level of private data leakage from ACDs. The
main contributions of the paper are fourfold.
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• First, it introduces a multi-recipient systemmodel which
is suited to liberalized electricity markets and a well-
studied cyber threat model, and it specifies a set of
functional and security requirements for the AMI.
• Secondly, it proposes a novel scheme (i.e., DEP2SA)
that supports a selective and secure delivery of ACDs
to respective multiple authorized recipients based on the
need-to-know and least privilege principles. In compari-
son with related schemes, DEP2SA imposes less compu-
tational and communication overheads, while achieving
privacy-preserving CD collection and distribution.
• Thirdly, it analyzes ACDs of varying numbers of users
and proposes a simple method to quantify the level of
private data leakage from these ACDs. This method can
be used to determine the minimum number of users
whose CDs should be aggregated to ensure a given level
of privacy preservation.
• Fourthly, it compares DEP2SA to two recent, most rel-
evant work: EPPA [8] and a scheme [9] that also aggre-
gates the data in a decentralizedmanner. The comparison
results demonstrate that DEP2SA is more efficient, in
terms of computational and communication costs, than
these schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses the related work. Sections, III and IV,
respectively, present design preliminaries and main building
blocks used in the design of DEP2SA. Section V describes the
DEP2SA scheme in detail, which is followed by its security
analysis in Section VI, users’ private data leakage analy-
sis in Section VII, and DEP2SA performance evaluation in
Section VIII. Finally, Section IX concludes the paper. Table 1
lists the acronyms used in the paper.
TABLE 1. Acronyms.
II. RELATED WORK
The importance of securing the SG and preserving users’
privacy is well recognized by standardization bodies,
e.g., NIST [17], IETF [18] and ETSI [19], and the research
community [20]–[26]. A number of efforts and proposals
have been made to strengthen the protection. For exam-
ple, Efthymiou and Kalogridis [27] proposed a method for
anonymising users’ fine-grained CDs sent by SMs, so autho-
rized entities cannot link the received CDs to their originators.
Lin et al. [28] proposed a system to allow users’ CDs to be
accessed at multiple time granularities, each identified by
a random number. A random number is added to a user’s
fine-grained CD and the result is sent to, and stored in,
a central database. The user can govern the time gran-
ularity at which her/his CD can be accessed by provid-
ing the corresponding random number(s) to data requesters.
Mármol et al. [29] proposed a protocol to allow users to
report their CDs to a supplier in a privacy-preserving manner.
With this proposal, each user’s SM encrypts the user’s CD
with a unique encryption key and then sends the encrypted
CD (ECD) and the key to the supplier and a key aggregator,
respectively. The key aggregator aggregates all the encryption
keys received and sends the resulting key to the supplier.
The supplier, then, aggregates all the received ECDs and
uses the aggregated key to recover the ACD. Although the
solutions proposed in [27]–[29] can preserve users’ privacy,
they are not scalable. As the number of users increases, the
computational and communication overheads in the entire
grid increase linearly.
Clearly, communicating ACDs instead of CDs helps
to reduce communication overheads and preserve users’
privacy. Our discussions here focus on privacy preservation
through the use of homomorphic encryption. Li et al. [5]
proposed an in-network aggregation scheme that uses SMs
to aggregate users’ ECDs en route for an authorized entity.
The scheme achieves a good level of scalability. However,
it only protects users’ CDs against passive attacks.
Deng and Yang [6] overcame this limitation by proposing to
digitally sign each ECD. Li and Luo [7] improved [6] in
terms of reducing overhead costs by using the Boneh-Lynn-
Shacham (BLS) signature scheme that allows the batch
verification of multiple signatures. They also introduced an
incremental verification technique that allows the collector
node to identify SMs feeding fake CDs. Li et al. [30] proposed
an efficient and fault-diagnosable authentication architecture
for AMI, which is also based on the BLS signature scheme.
To further reduce overheads, Lu et al. [8] proposed a scheme
which packs user’s multidimensional CDs into a single ECD,
whereas Ruj andNayak [9] proposed a decentralized aggrega-
tion method, in which data are aggregated at local gateways
en route for a central entity. A review and comparison of a
number of aggregation schemes can be found in [14].
These existing solutions are designed for a single-recipient
system model where one entity (per region) is assumed to do
both, manage the grid and supply all the users (within the
region) with electricity. These solutions may not be secure
and efficient when being applied to a liberalized market,
e.g., the UK market [31], where, to allow competition, grid
management and electricity supply are done by different
entities, and within one region, more than one entity may
supply the users with electricity. To support this multi-entity
model, Rottondi et al. [32] proposed an architecture contain-
ing additional functional entities, called privacy preserving
nodes (PPNs). Each SM splits its user’s CD into shares using
a secret sharing scheme and sends these shares to differ-
ent PPNs. PPNs perform aggregation of different sets of the
shares based on the CDs’ intended recipients. This solution
has two drawbacks. First, it introduces the additional entities
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FIGURE 2. A multi-recipient system model (architecture) used in the design of DEP2SA.
of PPNs, and this increases the SG complexity. Secondly,
it employs a secret sharing scheme that requires the distribu-
tion of shares, and this increases communication overheads.
The first drawback can be overcome by allocating the tasks
of PPNs to existing SG nodes (e.g., gateways) [33]. However,
the second drawback still remains. In addition, those exist-
ing schemes, which employ a homomorphic cryptosystem to
protect the confidentiality of the collected data, have not con-
sidered any security threats imposed by authorized insiders,
such as eavesdropping attacks by authorized entities. If an
authorized entity could eavesdrop a user’s ECD prior to data
aggregation, it can recover the user’s CD. To address these
limitations, we here propose a novel data aggregation and
collection solution, i.e., DEP2SA. DEP2SA is particularly
designed for a multi-recipient system model and achieves
security, privacy-preservation, efficiency and scalability.
It should be mentioned that the decentralized and selective
aggregation method has been previously published in [16].
However, this paper extends the aggregation method to allow
aggregating nodes to (i) detect and discard data coming from
malfunctioning/malicious SMs, (ii) report such SMs to grid
operators, and (iii) aggregate only the authentic data sent
by legitimate SMs. The MUSP system [34] has also used
the same aggregation method as in [16]. However, MUSP
does not extend the aggregation method, rather it combines
this method with other techniques to support additional ser-
vices such as user billing and supplier and/or account holder
switching.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section details the system and threat model, assumptions,
notations and requirements used in the design of the DEP2SA
scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model, as shown in Fig. 2, is adapted to the UK’s
liberalized market [31] and consists of the following entities:
• Trusted authority (TA): Trusted entity that regulates
electricity markets, e.g., in UK this is Ofgem [35].
• Grid operators: There is one transmission system oper-
ator (TSO) responsible for balancing the entire grid and
Nd distribution network operators (DNOs) each respon-
sible for maintaining the distribution network in a partic-
ular region and charging suppliers distribution network
fees based on the CDs of the suppliers’ customers in this
region.
• Suppliers: There are Ns suppliers each responsible for
supplying the electricity to its customers who may be
located in different regions across the grid.
• User: A customer who demands, consumes and pays
his/her supplier for the electricity consumed.
• Smart meter (SM): Advanced metering device that mea-
sures its user’s CD on a per time slot, tn, basis.
• Data communications company (DCC): A third party
entity that is responsible for collecting and communicat-
ing users’ data to authorized SG entities [36].
• Networking facility: It connects users’ SMs to the DCC
via a hierarchical network structure [21] consisting of
BANs, NANs and WANs. Each BAN, NAN and WAN
has a gateway (GW), i.e., a BAN GW (BG), an NAN
GW (NG) and a WAN GW (WG). A higher level GW
collects data received from a number of gateways at the
level immediate below it. A GW at the lowest level,
i.e., BG, collects data received from SMs that are con-
nected to the GW. The DCC collects data from WGs.
B. THREAT MODEL
The threat model used in the DEP2SA design is as follows:
• Users are untrustworthy and curious. They may try to
modify CDs sent by their SMs in attempt to gain finan-
cial advantage and/or learn other users’ CDs.
• DNOs are semi-trusted and curious. They report correct
data to TSO (so TSO can keep the grid in balance) but
they may manipulate data sent to suppliers in an attempt
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to gain financial advantage. They may also try to learn
individual users’ CDs and/or ACDs of any group of users
located in other DNOs’ regions.
• DCC is honest but curious. It follows protocol speci-
fications but it may try to find out CDs of individual
users and/or ACDs of any group of users. Also, the DCC
is trusted by the authorized data recipients (i.e., TSO,
DNOs and suppliers) to act as expected.
• Suppliers are suspicious and curious. They do not
assume (or they do not trust) that DNOs would always
charge them the right distribution network fees. They
may also attempt to learn individual users’ CDs and/or
ACDs of any group of customers contracted by their
competitors (i.e., other suppliers).
• External entities are untrustworthy or even malicious.
They may eavesdrop data in transit trying to gain access
to confidential data and/or modify the data in an attempt
to disrupt the SG.
C. ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are used in the DEP2SA design:
• Each entity in the system model has a unique ID.
• SMs are tamper-proof and sealed. No one (including
their users) could tamper with them without being
detected.
• All entities are time synchronized.
• For the sake of simplicity, each BG collects data
from Nsm (number of) SMs, each NG collects data
from Nbg BGs and each WG from Nng NGs. There are
NwgWGs in each region andNGwgWGs in thewhole grid.
D. NOTATIONS
We denote the ith SM as smi ∈ SM, where SM is the set of all
the SMs in the grid, and the CD during the nth time slot, tn,
measured by smi as e
tn
smi ∈ Etn , where Etn is the set of CDs
during tn measured by all the SMs (of all the users) in the grid.
We denote the following subsets of SM and Etn :
• SMdj ⊂ SM as the set of all the SMs operated by the jth
DNO, dj, (located in region j).
• SMsu ⊆ SM as the set of all the SMs whose users are
supplied by the uth supplier, su.
• SMdj,su ⊆ SMdj and ⊆ SMsu as the set of all the SMs
operated by dj and whose users are supplied by su.
• SMbgβ ,dj ⊂ SMdj as the set of all the SMs connected to
βth BG, bgβ , and operated by dj.
• SMbgβ ,dj,su ⊆ SMbgβ ,dj as the set of all the SMs
connected to bgβ , operated by dj and whose users are
supplied by su.
• Etndj , E
tn
su and E
tn
dj,su
as the sets of CDs during tn mea-
sured by the SMs belonging to the sets SMdj , SMsu and
SMdj,su , respectively.
Also,
∑
(X ) denotes the aggregate (sum) value of all elements
in the set X . More notations are given in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Notations.
E. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The AMI application should satisfy the following functional
and security requirements.
1) FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
(F1) Each malfunctioning and/or under-attack SM/GW
should be identified as early as possible and reported
to the regional DNO, so necessary actions can be
taken.
(F2) At each tn, each DNO, dj, should be able to access
a)
∑
(Etndj ), so it can better manage the distribution
network in its region, and
b)
∑
(Etndj,su ) for u = {1, . . . ,Ns}, so it can split
distribution network fees fairly among suppliers.
(F3) At each tn, each supplier, su, should be able to access
a)
∑
(Etnsu ), so it can predict its customers’ demand
accurately to avoid imbalance fines, and
b)
∑
(Etndj,su ) for j = {1, . . . ,Nd}, so it can be assured
that it pays the correct distribution network fee to
each DNO, i.e., it is not over(under)charged.
(F4) At each tn, the TSO should be able to access
a) all
∑
(Etndj ) for j = {1, . . . ,Nd}, and
b)
∑
(Etn ), so it can balance the grid efficiently.
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2) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
(S1) Message authenticity: The recipient should be
assured that the message has not been altered during
transit, is fresh and indeed from the claimed source.
(S2) Confidentiality of users’ data: Users’ fine-grained
ACDs should only be accessed by authorized entities.
(S3) User privacy preservation: individual users’ fine-
grained CDs should not be revealed to any SG entity.
(S4) Authorization: Entities should only be allowed to
access the ACDs of their users, i.e., the users they
operate in case of a DNO; the users they supply in
case of a supplier.
(S5) Availability: Protocols should be designed such that
they are resilient to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS
The bilinear pairing based BLS short signature scheme [37],
the aggregate signature scheme [38] and the Paillier cryp-
tosystem [3] are used as the building blocks in our design.
This section reviews briefly these schemes.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING BASED SIGNATURE SCHEMES
The BLS short signature scheme [37] generates a signature
with its length being only half of the size of a DSA signature
for a similar level of security. It also allows the construction of
an aggregate signature [38] from multiple signatures signed
on different messages by different users and this aggregate
signature can be batch verified.
Let (G,GT , q, g, e,H ) be the digital signature system
parameters whereG andGT are two cyclic groups of the same
prime order q, g ∈ G is a generator, e : G × G → GT is a
bilinear map (i.e., e is efficiently computable, e(g, g) 6= 1
and e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ Z [39]) and
H : {0, 1}∗→ G is a cryptographic hash function.
1) BLS SHORT SIGNATURE SCHEME
The scheme comprises three algorithms: a key genera-
tion algorithm (KeyGen), a signature generation algorithm
(SigGen) and a signature verification algorithm (SigVer).
• KeyGen: Select randomly x R←− Zq and compute y = gx .
The secret key is x ∈ Zq. The public key is y ∈ G.
• SigGen: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and secret key x,
compute the signature σ = H (m)x , σ ∈ G.
• SigVer: Given the public key y, message m, and signa-
ture σ , accept if e(g, σ ) = e(y,H (m)) holds.
2) AGGREGATE SIGNATURE SCHEME
The scheme comprises four algorithms: a key genera-
tion algorithm (KeyGen), a signature generation algorithm
(SigGen), a signature aggregation algorithm (SigAgg) and a
signature verification algorithm (SigVer).
• KeyGen & SigGen: These two algorithms are the same
as the algorithms described in Section IV-A1. Suppose
that there are n distinct users. Each user ui, where
i = {1, . . . , n}, generates its secret key, xi, and
public key, yi. Then, ui signs its message mi and obtains
its signature, σi.
• SigAgg: An aggregated signature is computed by
multiplying individual signatures, σ agg =∏ni=1 σi.
• SigVer: Given n users’ public keys, y1, . . . , yn, theirmes-
sages, m1, . . . ,mn, and the aggregate signature on the
messages, σ agg, compute H (mi). Accept if all the mes-
sages are distinct and e(g, σ agg) = ∏ni=1 e(yi,H (mi))
holds.
B. Paillier CRYPTOSYSTEM
The Paillier cryptosystem [3] has an additive homomorphism
property, and it is relatively efficient and semantically secure.
It comprises three algorithms: a key generation algorithm
(KeyGen), an encryption algorithm (Enc) and a decryption
algorithm (Dec).
• KeyGen: Choose two large prime numbers (p1, q1).
Calculate n = p1.q1, λ = lcm (p1 − 1, q1 − 1). Define
L(u) = (u−1)/n. Choose a generator g ∈ Z∗
n2
. Calculate
µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n. The public key is hpk =
(n, g) and the private key is hsk = (λ,µ).
• Enc: Given a message m ∈ Zn, choose a random number
r ∈ Z∗n . Compute the ciphertext C = Enc(m) =
gm. rn mod n2.
• Dec: Given the ciphertext C ∈ Z∗
n2
, recover the message
m = Dec(C) = L(Cλ mod n2). µmod n.
The Paillier cryptosystem has the following two properties:
• Additive homomorphism: Multiplying the ciphertexts
of x messages results in a ciphertext of the sum of the
messages, e.g.,
C(m1).C(m2) = (gm1 . rn1 ).(gm2 . rn2 )mod n2
= g(m1+m2). (r1.r2)n mod n2
= C(m1 + m2). (1)
• Random number recovery: Given a message, m, its
ciphertext C and the private key hsk , the random num-
ber r used in the encryption of m can be recovered by
computing the following equation.
r = (Cg−m mod n)n−1 mod λ mod n. (2)
V. THE DEP2SA SCHEME
This section describes our novel data aggregation scheme, the
DEP2SA scheme. Prior to the detailed description, we first
give an overview of the scheme (which is also shown in Fig. 3)
and outline the system initialization process.
A. OVERVIEW of DEP2SA
Each DNO has a homomorphic private/public key pair,
so each of them acts as an independent prime authorized
entity. Each SM encrypts its data with the homomoprhic
public key of its regional DNO and sends the ciphertext
(attached with the ID of the DNO and the ID of its user’s
contracted supplier) to its local gateway. Each gateway aggre-
gates the received ciphertexts based on the attached supplier
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FIGURE 3. An overview of DEP2SA.
ID and forwards the resulted ciphertexts to the next level
gateway (DCC). TheDCC aggregates the received ciphertexts
based on the attached DNO ID and supplier ID, producing
respective region-supplier-based ciphertexts. Then, the DCC
forwards selections of these ciphretexts to their respective
recipients, i.e. the corresponding DNOs and suppliers.
In this way, each DNO/supplier only receives the aggregated
ciphertexts attached with its own ID. It is worth noting that
the suppliers can not decrypt these cipertexts; they use these
ciphertexts for verification purposes.
Upon the receipt of the region-supplier-based ciphertexts,
each DNO performs the following tasks: (1) decrypts the
ciphertexts to obtain the corresponding supplier-based ACDs
of the users located in its region of operation, (2) uses the
ACDs along with its homomorphic private key to recover
the random number embedded in each of these ciphertexts,
(3) sends each pair of the recovered ACD and the random
number to their respective suppliers (secondary authorized
entities), and (4) aggregates all of its recovered supplier-based
ACDs and sends the resulted ACD to the TSO.
Upon the receipt of each ACD and random number pair
from each of the DNOs, each supplier computes the cipher-
texts using these ACDs, random numbers and the homomor-
phic public key of the respective DNOs, and then verifies the
correctness of the received ACDs by comparing the computed
ciphertexts to the ciphertexts received from the DCC. Finally,
the TSO aggregates all the received ACDs.
It should be emphasized that, as the result of using
the decentralized and selective data aggregation approach,
DEP2SA can offer significant bandwidth savings compared
to the centralized aggregation approach. For example, with
the decentralized aggregation approach, each gateway sends
a single message containing only Ns ciphertexts, where Ns
is the number of suppliers in a liberalized electricity market.
In contrast, with the centralized aggregation approach, the
ciphertexts generated by every single SM will have to be sent
to the central aggregating entity (the DCC).
B. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
The system initialization comprises three phases: (1) system
parameters setup, (2) key generation and distribution and (3)
SM/GW installation and key establishment.
1) SYSTEM PARAMETERS SETUP
A trusted authority (TA) generates the system’s parameters,
(G,GT , q, g, e), defines a hash function, H , selects a random
number xta
R←− Zq and computes yta = gxta . Here, xta ∈ Zq
is the system’s master secret key and yta ∈ G is the system’s
master public key. TA keeps xta secret, but publishes all other
system parameters, i.e., {G,GT , q, g, e, yta,H}.
2) KEY GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION
This phase is divided into three steps outlined below.
Step 1 is executed during a license acquisition process:
• The DCC, TSO, DNOs and suppliers each generates a
distinct BLS public/secret key pair, {yi, xi}, using the
KeyGen algorithm described in Section IV-A1. These
keys are used for data verification/signing.
• The TSO, DNOs and the suppliers each generates a dis-
tinct public/private key pair, {pki, ski}, using a standard
public-key algorithm such as RSA. These keys are for
data encryption and decryption.
• DNOs each generates a distinct homomorphic pub-
lic/private key pair, {hpkdj , hskdj}, using the KeyGen
algorithm described in Section IV-B.
• The TA signs all the public keys generated by the DCC,
TSO, DNOs and suppliers with its secret key, xta. These
are done through the generation of a digital certificate
for all such keys of each entity.
Step 2 is executed during SM manufacturing process:
• Each SM generates a distinct BLS public/secret key pair,
{ysmi , xsmi}.
• The TA generates a digital certificate for the public key
of each SM.
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TABLE 3. Keys and certificates of entities.
• Each SM is equipped with the digital certificate certify-
ing its public key. The corresponding secret key is kept
secret and tamper-proof.
Step 3 is executed during GW manufacturing process:
• Each GW generates a distinct BLS public/secret key
pair, {ybgβ , xbgβ }.
• The DCC generates and signs a certificate for the public
key generated by each GW.
• Each GW is equipped with the certificate certifying its
public key. The corresponding secret key is kept secret
and tamper-proof.
All the entities’ keys and certificates are listed in Table
3. For simplicity, the table only lists the entity’s ID and
certified keys contained in each certificate. A certificate typ-
ically contains a number of data items including: version
number, serial number, issuing certification authority’s (CA’s)
ID, CA’s digital signature, subject/owner, owner’s public key,
validity period, certificate usage, signature algorithm and
extensions. Also for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that,
if an entity has more than one public key, all the public keys
are certified in a single certificate.
3) SM/GW INSTALLATION AND KEY ESTABLISHMENT
This phase is also divided into three steps outlined below.
Step 1:During an SM installation, the digital certificates of
the SM’s regional DNO, its local BG and its user’s contracted
supplier are installed onto the SM.
Step 2:During a GW installation, each BG is installed with
the certificates of its child SMs and its parent NG. Similarly,
each NG is installed with its child BGs’ and its parent WG’s
certificates, and each WG with its child NGs’ and DCC’s
certificates. Each GW is installed with its regional DNO’s
certificate and has a list of its child SMs/GWs.
Step 3:After the installations, each BG establishes a secure
channel with each of its child SMs. This can be done by
establishing a shared secret (i.e., a symmetric key), e.g., kbgβ ,
between the entities using a standard security protocol such
as TLS [40]. This secret should be updated regularly.
C. DEP2SA IN DETAIL
The DEP2SA scheme consists of three parts: (1) SM report
generation, (2) decentralized and selective data aggregation
and (3) data distribution and access.
1) SM REPORT GENERATION
At every time slot tn, each SM generates a report that contains
its user’s ECD and sends it to its local BG. This processing
step (PSM) is described next and shown in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. SM report generation: the PSM processing step.
PSM : At the start of a slot, say tn+1, each SM, smi,
constructs a message that contains its user’s ECD con-
sumed during the previous slot, tn, and sends the message
to its local BG, bgβ . In detail, smi performs the following
operations.
1. It reads its user’s CD in slot tn, e
tn
smi , from its register.
2. It encrypts etnsmi with its regional DNO’s homomor-
phic public key generating C tnsmi = Enchpkdj (e
tn
smi ).
This encryption is to protect etnsmi against eavesdropping
attacks by unauthorized entities.
3. It encrypts {IDsu ‖ C tnsmi} with the symmetric key it
shares with bgβ generating csmi = Ekbgβ (IDsu ‖ C
tn
smi ),
where IDsu is the ID of the user’s supplier, su. This
encryption is to protect the confidentiality of (i) etnsmi
against eavesdropping attacks by authorized entities
(i.e., the regional DNO that holds the homomorphic
private key, hskdj ) and (ii) IDsu against eavesdropping
attacks by unauthorized entities.
4. It constructs Msmi = {IDsmi ‖ IDbgβ ‖ IDdj ‖ csmi ‖
TStn ‖ TSsmi}, where IDsmi , IDbgβ and IDdj are the IDs
of the SM, local BG and regional DNO, respectively,
TStn is the time stamp of the slot tn, used to uniquely
identify the slot (e.g., date-tn), and TSsmi is the SM’s
local time stamp used to resist replay attacks.
5. It signs on Msmi to generate a signature, σsmi =
H (Msmi )
xsmi , which is used to resist active attacks (any
forgery or unauthorized modification of data).
6. It constructs and sends msgsmi = {Msmi ‖ σsmi} to its
local BG, e.g., bgβ .
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2) DECENTRALIZED AND SELECTIVE DATA AGGREGATION
At every time slot, tn, users’ ECDs are grouped and aggre-
gated at various levels in the network. In other words, data
aggregations are performed progressively at different nodes
as the data traverse across the different networks. At eachGW,
data aggregation is performed respectively based on the users’
suppliers, and at the DCC, based on the users’ suppliers as
well as locations. This part consists of four processing steps:
PBG, PNG, PWG and PDCC,1.
PBG: Each BG receives messages from its child SMs,
verifies and groups them based on the users’ suppliers, aggre-
gates the ECDs contained in the messages in each group, and
sends the aggregated ECDs (AECDs) to its upstream NG.
If some of the received messages fail to arrive or fail the
verifications after multiple attempts, the BG reports the SMs
that dispatch the unsuccessful messages to its regional DNO,
and aggregates only the ECDs carried in messages that have
passed successfully the verifications. A flowchart of the BG’s
operations is shown in Fig. 5 and explained below.
1. At the start of slot tn+1, each BG, bgβ , changes the status
of all its child SMs on its list to mp (i.e., it is pending
receipt of messages), resets its registers and starts a
countdown timer, tmr1. This timer sets the maximum
time period bgβ should wait for any pending messages
before it performs a batch verification of signatures on
the received and partially verified messages. The value
of this period should be chosen such that, by the expi-
ration of this value, bgβ should have received messages
from all of the SMs it connects, so that it could batch
verify them. This batch verification is used to reduce
the computational cost at bgβ (more details are given
shortly).
2. bgβ checks the timers’ status (more details are given
below).
3. bgβ checks if it has received a new message.
4. For each received message, msgsmi , bgβ verifies the data
contained in the message in terms of:
a) freshness (V fr ), i.e., it checks if the difference
between its local time stamp and the time stamp
contained in msgsmi is less than a predefined
value (t1), i.e., if |TSbgβ − TSsmi | ≤ t1,
b) recipient (V rec), i.e., it checks if the ID of the
intended recipient of msgsmi , IDbgβ , is the same as
its own ID contained in its certificate,
c) sender (V sen), i.e., it checks if the ID of the claimed
sender of msgsmi , IDsmi , is the same as the ID of one
of its child SMs on its list,
d) status (V st ), i.e., it checks if smi’s status on its list
is mp,
e) time slot (V ts), i.e., it checks if TStn is the expected
one (in sequence).
V fr is used to resist replay attacks.V rec andV sen are used
to eliminate messages that are not destined (expected) to
(by) bgβ . V
st and V ts are used to resist faulty/malicious
SMs which send (i) more than one authentic messages
during tn and (ii) messages containing CDs measured
FIGURE 5. A flowchart of the operations at a BG: the PBG processing step.
at a time slot different than tn, respectively. These ver-
ification methods are lightweight and aim to detect
faulty/malicious SMs as early as possible, reduce com-
putational costs at BGs and ensure that the correct data
are aggregated.
5. It changes smi’s status on its list to mr (received)
and performs a pairing operation, i.e., e(ysmi ,H (Msmi )).
An SMwith status mr means that its message passed the
initial lightweight verifications described in the previous
step.
6. If some messages fail to arrive or fail to pass any of
the verifications before the expiration of tmr1, bgβ starts
tmr2 (i.e., extends the period set by tmr1) and requests
SMs with status mp on its list to resend their messages.
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FIGURE 6. Decentralized and selective data aggregation: the main operations of the PBG, PNG, PWG and PDCC,1 processing steps.
Note that if bgβ receives messages from all the SMs
it connects before the expiration of tmr1 and if these
messages are authentic, bgβ skips this step.
7. It computes an aggregate signature of the messages from
SMs with status mr, i.e., σ agg = ∏ σsmi , where smi ∈
{SMbgβ ,dj∧ has a status mr}, and verifies σ agg using the
batch verification method (V σ
agg
), i.e., if e(g, σ agg) =∏
e(ysmi ,H (Msmi )). If V
σ agg is positive, bgβ accepts
the messages, changes the SMs’ status from mr to ma
(authentic), decrypts csmi in the messages using kbgβ and
skips the next step. Note that this step is not necessary,
but it is good for efficiency as, to batch verify x mes-
sages, bgβ has to perform x + 1 computationally expen-
sive pairing operations, as opposed to 2x, if it verifies
them one by one. An SM with status ma means that its
message passed all the verifications and the ciphertext in
the message can be aggregated.
8. If V σ
agg
is not positive or is not performed, then for
each msgsmi from SMs with status m
r, bgβ performs
signature verification (V σ ), i.e., checks if e(g, σsmi ) =
e(ysmi ,H (Msmi )). If V
σ is positive, bgβ changes the sta-
tus of smi to ma and decrypts csmi contained in msgsmi .
Otherwise, if V σ is negative, it changes the status to mp
and requests smi to retransmit msgsmi .
9. It groups and aggregates users’ ECDs (from SMs with
status ma) based on the users’ suppliers (i.e., the
ECDs destined to the same supplier are aggregated
into one AECD), i.e., C tnbgβ ,dj,su =
∏
C tnsmi for u =
{1, . . . ,Ns}, where smi ∈ {SMbgβ ,dj,su∧ has a sta-
tus ma}. If its registers are reset, bgβ stores C tnbgβ ,dj,su .
Otherwise it multiplies them with the ones already
stored and updates its registers with the result. Then,
it changes the status of the SMs from ma to magg
(aggregated), i.e., the ciphertexts in their messages were
aggregated.
10. If tmr2 times out, bgβ reports all the SMs with status m
p
to the regional DNO using a standard protocol such as
TLS (satisfying (F1)). Note that bgβ skips this step if it
receives messages from all the SMs it connects before
expiration of {tmr1 + tmr2} and if all the messages pass
V fr , V rec, V sen, V st , V ts and V σ verifications.
11. It reads the supplier-based AECDs from its registers,
constructs msgbgβ = {Mbgβ ‖ σbgβ }, where Mbgβ =
{IDbgβ ‖ IDngη ‖ IDdj ‖ (IDs1 ‖ C tnbgβ ,dj,s1 ) ‖
. . . ‖ (IDsNs ‖ C tnbgβ ,dj,sNs ) ‖ TS
tn ‖ TSbgβ }, σbgβ =
H (Mbgβ )
xbgβ , sends msgbgβ to its local NG, resets its
timers, and waits until the start of the next slot.
Note that SMs’ status helps a BG keep track of the SMs
whose (i) messages are pending and (ii) data are aggregated.
So, DEP2SA allows further information to be included in the
aggregated messages along the network such as the aggregate
value includes x out y SMs (y-x failed to report). This number
would be different at each level, as appropriate.
PNG & PWG : The operations performed by each NG (WG)
are similar to those carried out by BGs except that the
messages processed are from BGs (NGs), and the symmetric
decryption in Steps 7 and 8 is skipped as none of the GWs
perform encryption tasks. For example, bgβ , in contrast to
smi, sends {IDsu ‖ C tnbgβ ,dj,su} as it is.
PDCC,1 : The operations performed by the DCC are similar
to those performed by NGs/WGs except that the messages
processed are from WGs, and AECDs are aggregated based
on users’ suppliers and users’ locations (i.e., DNOs) (rather
than just based on the users’ suppliers).
Without loss of generality, Fig. 6 summarizes the main
operations in the PBG, PNG, PWG and PDCC,1 processing
steps assuming that all the messages in these steps are authen-
tic and received on time.
3) DATA DISTRIBUTION AND ACCESS
DCC distributes different sets of AECDs to their respective
authorized recipients, i.e., DNOs and suppliers. The DNOs
recover users’ ACDs from the AECDs and send respective
sets of the ACDs to the TSO and the corresponding suppliers.
These steps are summarized in Fig. 7 and explained below.
PDCC,2: For each DNO, e.g., dj, DCC constructs a message
that contains the supplier-based AECDs of the users in the
region managed by the DNO, i.e., {C tndj,s1 , . . . ,C
tn
dj,sNs
}. It then
signs the message and sends it to the DNO.
PDCC,3: For each supplier, e.g., su, DCC constructs a
message that contains the region-based AECDs of the users
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FIGURE 7. Data distribution and access: the PDCC,2, PDCC,3, PDNO, PS and PTSO processing steps.
supplied by the supplier, i.e., {C tnd1,su , . . . ,C
tn
dNd ,su
}. It then
signs the message and sends it to the supplier.
As the number of grid operators and suppliers in the grid
is small, the TSO, DNOs and suppliers can use a standard
protocol such as TLS to establish secure and authentic com-
munication channels between each pair of them (or among
themselves). Thus, in the next processing steps we only
present the data which these entities send to each other.
PDNO: Each DNO verifies the message received from
the DCC, recovers the supplier-based ACDs (Ns included
in the message in total) using its homomorphic private key
(satisfying (F2b)), recovers also the random number embed-
ded in each AECD using (2), and sends both items to the
respective suppliers. Then, it calculates the total ACD in its
region, i.e.,
∑
(Etndj ) =
∑Ns
u=1
∑
(Etndj,su ) (satisfying (F2a)),
and sends the result to the TSO.
PS : Each supplier verifies the message received from the
DCC and obtains the region-based AECDs. It then, upon
receiving a message from each DNO, recovers the ACD
and the random number, and use them (together with the
homomorphic public key of the corresponding DNO) to
compute the AECD. If the AECD computed is the same as
the AECD received from the DCC, the supplier accepts the
ACD as authentic (satisfying (F3b)). It then computes the
ACD of all its customers, i.e.,
∑
(Etnsu ) =
∑Nd
j=1
∑
(Etndj,su )
(satisfying (F3a)).
PTSO: Upon receiving a message from each DNO, the
TSO recovers the ACD for each DNO, e.g.,
∑
(Etndj ),
(satisfying (F4a)). It then calculates the ACD of all the users
in the grid, i.e.,
∑
(Etn ) =∑Ndj=1∑ (Etndj ) (satisfying (F4b)).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the security and privacy properties
of the DEP2SA scheme.
A. PROTOCOL MESSAGE AUTHENTICITY
Each message in the DEP2SA scheme contains a BLS short
signature which is proven secure under chosen-message
attack in the random oracle model assuming that the
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard [37], [38].
In addition, the signature signing keys are stored in tamper-
proof devices, and the corresponding signature verification
keys are certified by the TA. Hence, DEP2SA provides assur-
ance of source authentication, non-repudiation of origin and
integrity of each protocol message (satisfying (S1)). Any
active attacks on the data in transit can be detected and the
modified data discarded. Including a time stamp in each
message also ensures that all received messages are fresh.
B. CONFIDENTIALITY OF USERS’ CDs
In DEP2SA, users’ CDs are encrypted at their source (SMs)
using the Paillier cryptosystem, then the ECDs are progres-
sively aggregated, and the AECDs are delivered to DNOs,
where ACDs are recovered and selections of them are deliv-
ered, respectively, to their need-to-know entities (TSO and
suppliers). As the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure
against chosen plaintext attacks (assuming that the Composite
Residuosity Class problem is hard [3]) and communication
channels connecting the TSO, DNOs and suppliers are secure
and authentic (e.g., established using TLS), only authorized
entities (i.e., the TSO, DNOs and suppliers) can access the
ACDs of users (satisfying (S2)). All the external entities and
unauthorized internal entities (including GWs, the DCC),
should they eavesdropmessages in transit, would only be able
to access the ECDs or AECDs (but not ACDs) of the users.
C. USER PRIVACY-PRESERVATION
With DEP2SA, a DNO receives only the supplier-based
AECDs of the users located in its region of operation.
In other words, the most fine grained CDs which a DNO and
a supplier have access to is the ACDs of a set of users located
in a particular region and supplied by a particular supplier,
and usually the size of this set is on the order of thousands.
Even authorized entities (i.e., the TSO, DNOs, suppliers) do
not have access to individual users’ CDs. Moreover, unlike
other schemes, DEP2SA is also resistant against eavesdrop-
ping attacks by authorized entities as users’ CDs are double
encrypted (first with the regional DNO’s homomorphic public
key and then with the key shared between the SMs and their
local BG) while in transit between the SMs and the BG. For
the similar reason, if DNOs’ homomorphic private keys are
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compromised, DEP2SA can still operate and protect users’
privacy as the most fine-grained data attackers could access is
the AECDs sent by BGs. As long as these AECDs contain the
ACDs of a sufficient number of users (more details are given
in Section VII), it is hard for attackers to work out individual
users’ CDs (satisfying (S3)). Also, as the IDs of users’ con-
tracted suppliers are encrypted while in transit between SMs
and BGs, eavesdroppers can not figure out which supplier is
contracted by which user.
D. AUTHORIZATION TO ACCESS USERS’ ACDs
The ‘principle of least privilege’ (i.e., only allow an entity to
have access to data just sufficient for it to carry out its duties
(business responsibilities)) has been applied in the design
of DEP2SA. The use of the region-based cryptographic key
deployment (i.e., each DNO has its own homomorphic pub-
lic/private key pair) combined with the recipient-based selec-
tive aggregation of users’ ECDs ensures that only the DNOs
that need to know a set of users’ CDs can actually decrypt
the ACD of this set, thus making the scheme resilient to
attacks mounted by external and authorized internal entities
such as the elevation of privilege attacks (satisfying (S4)).
Also, the use of the recipient-based selective distribution of
ACDs ensures that suppliers receive only the ACDs of their
customers.
E. AVAILABILITY
DEP2SA is designed with resilience to DoS attacks in mind.
As it uses a decentralized approach to message verifications
and data aggregation, there is no entity in the system that
bares an imbalanced processing load during an execution of
the scheme, thus avoiding the creation of a performance bot-
tleneck. This approach brings us an extra advantage, i.e., mali-
cious or unauthorizedmessages can be detected by a node that
is one-hop away from their originators and can immediately
be discarded upon the detections. In addition, the verifying
entities first deploy lightweight verification methods to detect
any unauthorized messages, thus reducing the risks of any
DoS attacks affecting the performance of DEP2SA (satisfying
(S5)).
TABLE 4. Security level comparison.
F. SECURITY LEVEL COMPARISON
The security properties achieved by DEP2SA in comparison
with related schemes [5]–[9] are summarized in Table 4.
Compared to these schemes, DEP2SA achieves the highest
level of protections.
G. CLOUD-BASED DCC
Delegating the operations of the DCC to a semi-trusted cloud
service provider should not affect the security and privacy
properties of the DEP2SA scheme. The DCC only handles,
and operates on, ciphertexts, so its operations can be dele-
gated to a semi-trusted cloud service provider. This provider
will not have access to any of the CDs and/or ACDs of
users. To ensure the correct operation of the DEP2SA scheme,
the provider should aggregate the ciphertexts generated by
subsets of users (the ciphertexts attached with the sameDNOs
and suppliers IDs form one subset) and then distribute the
aggregated ciphertexts to their respective authorized recip-
ients (i.e., DNOs and suppliers). Considering that a cloud
service provider is usually paid based on the amount of data
it processes, and that the amount of data a service provider
is expected to process (in our system model) at any given
time slot will be constant (as the number of SMs served
would remain the same for a given time slot), there is no
financial incentive for the cloud service provider to group and
aggregate the ciphertexts incorrectly as this will not affect the
amount of money payable to the service provider. On the con-
trary, there is every incentive for the cloud service provider to
perform the aggregations and to provide the DCC services
correctly and truthfully, as this will enhance its reputation,
which, in turn, can increase its business standing and market
share.
VII. USER PRIVATE DATA LEAKAGE FROM AGGREGATED
CONSUMPTION DATA
Although the authorized entities in DEP2SA receive only
ACDs (not individual users’ CDs), they may still manage to
obtain some of the individual users’ private data by analyzing
the receivedACDs. In this section we discuss potential private
data leakage from ACDs and propose a simple method to
quantify it. Such method can be used for finding out the
minimum number of users whose CDs should be aggregated
such that the resulted ACD provides sufficient user privacy
preservation.
A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND OUR AIM
Suppose that there are two sets of users. The first set has
10000 users and the set of CDs of these users is denoted
as E104 . The second set has only two users and the set of
CDs of these two users is denoted as E2. If an entity has
access only to the ACD of the first set of users, denoted as∑
(E104 ), it would be difficult (if not impossible) for the entity
to disaggregate
∑
(E104 ) into CDs of individual users. The
entity may only learn some statistical patterns of this set of
users, but not individual users’ consumption patterns or some
relevant behaviors or activities.
However, this is not the case for the second set of users.
Owing to the small number of users in it, if an entity has
access to the ACD of this set of users, i.e.,
∑
(E2), it may
be feasible for the entity to disaggregate
∑
(E2) into individ-
ual components and learn each of the users’ raw CDs. The
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entity then, with the help of NILM techniques, can translate
such users’ raw CDs into users’ specific behaviors/activities,
breaching the users’ privacy. It is worth noting that with a
small set of users, even the ACD such as
∑
(E2) can be
translated to users’ specific activities, as
∑
(E2) may not be
sufficient to disguise some specific appliance load signatures.
The example above clearly shows that the level of pri-
vate data leakage from an ACD is dependent on individual
users’ CDs and the number of users whose CDs formed
the ACD. How to measure/quantify such leakage is an open
question.
Our aim is to propose a method that can quantify the level
of private data leakage from an ACD, thus to provide the
designers of SG/AMI with a tool to find out the minimum
number of users whose CDs should be aggregated so that the
risk of inferring a user’s private behavior or activities from
the ACD can be controlled at an acceptable level.
B. DEFINITIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL DATASET
We define a notation of ‘strong’ user privacy if none of the
entities (described in Section III-A) can access individual
users’ raw CDs and/or detect some specific human activities
or appliance operations and link them to individual users.
We also define a notation of ‘strong’ adversary capability
if the adversary (including authorized entities) has a NILM
algorithm that can decompose an user’s CD into a set of
appliance CDs with 100% accuracy.
Our analysis is based on a real-life dataset, ‘‘Electricity
Customer Behavior Trial’’ [41], that contains 6,287 users’
CDs collected at 30-minute intervals for 536 days.
C. OUR HYPOTHESIS
Usually the ACD of a large number of users is available in the
public domain. For example, the real-time electricity demand
data of a country (or a region in a county) are regularly
published by the county’s grid operators (e.g., the real-time
demand data of UK is available at [42]). These data can give
some indications of the electricity consumption patterns of
the country’s entire population. However, owing to the large
number of users in the set, it is hard for an adversary to learn
a particular user’s consumption pattern (specific activities)
from the ACD. The only useful information the adversary
may get from the ACD is the users’ overall behavior.
Assuming that an adversary has access to the ACD of a
large number of users,
∑
(Ex), we argue that the ACD of
a subset of these users,
∑
(Ey), would leak no or minimum
information with regards to an individual user’s private data
as long as
∑
(Ey) follows the same trend as
∑
(Ex), i.e., as
long as the difference between the two ACD distributions
over a period of time, P6(Etnx ) and P6(Etny ), is negligible. The
difference between the two distributions can be measured by
the K-divergence [43], i.e.,
K =
Nt∑
n=1
P6(Etny ) log
2P6(Etny )
P6(Etny ) + P6(Etnx )
. (3)
An advantageous property of the K-divergence as com-
pared to other distance measures, such as the the relative
entropy, is that its value is between zero and one [43].
D. THE EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
Here we use the dataset from [41] to analyze the statistical
differences between the ACD distribution of all the users in
a neighborhood and the ACD distributions of various subsets
of these users over a 24-hour time period. The ACD of users
in a given set can be computed by:∑
(EtnNsm ) =
Nsm∑
i=1
etnsmi , for n = {1, . . .Nt}, (4)
where etnsmi is the CD during tn of the ith user in the set, Nt is
the resolution of CDs (e.g., in a given period of 24 hours, if
CDs are taken at every 30-minute interval, then Nt = 48) and
Nsm is the size of the set (which is the number of users whose
CDs are aggregated).
The experiment is carried out as follows. First a 24-hour
period is randomly chosen, a set containing the CDs dur-
ing this period of all the users from the dataset, i.e., E6287
(Nsm = 6287, equivalent to a typical neighborhood), is
formed and the ACD of all the users in the set, i.e.,
∑
(Etn6287),
is computed using (4). Then a subset of E6287 containing the
CD of only one randomly chosen user from the dataset is
formed. Next, iteratively, the CD of another randomly chosen
user from the remaining dataset is included in the subset.
After each iteration the ACD of all the users in the subset is
computed using (4). Then the distributions of the ACD of all
the users in (i) different versions of the subset, i.e., P6(EtnNsm )
for Nsm = {1, . . . , 6286} (some shown in Fig. 8a to Fig. 8k),
and (ii) in E6287, i.e., P6(Etn6287) (Fig. 8l), over the 24-hour
period are computed by:
P6(EtnNsm )
=
∑
(EtnNsm )
Nt∑
n=1
∑
(EtnNsm )
. (5)
The K-divergence between each of P6(EtnNsm )
(Nsm =
{1, . . . , 6286}) and P6(Etn6287) are computed using (3).
As shown in Fig. 8, as Nsm increases, P6(EtnNsm )
becomes more
similar to P6(Etn6287)
, thus the K-divergence between them
decreases accordingly. The more similar the two distributions
are, the less individual users’ private data is leaked from∑
(EtnNsm ). Therefore, the K-divergence value can be used as a
measure of the level of private data leakage from ACDs. The
smaller K is, the less private data about individual users could
be leaked.
To minimize the effect of the order in the selection of
the members of the subset ENsm (Nsm = {1, . . . , 6286}),
we run our experiment 100 times with 100 different and
randomly chosen such subsets and compute the average
K-divergence value (as shown in Fig. 9). We observe that as
we increase Nsm, the K-divergence (the difference) between
P6(EtnNsm )
and P6(Etn6287)
decreases rapidly until it reaches a
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FIGURE 8. The ACD distributions of subsets with an increasing number of users from a dataset, i.e., P
6(Etn1 )
(8a), ..., P
6(Etn5000)
(8k), and the ACD
distribution of all the users in the dataset, i.e., P
6(Etn6287)
(8l), over a 24-hour period. (a) Nsm = 1, K = 1.08 ∗ 10−1. (b) Nsm = 2, K = 5.97 ∗ 10−2. (c)
Nsm = 5, K = 2.17 ∗ 10−2. (d) Nsm = 10, K = 1.59 ∗ 10−2. (e) Nsm = 20, K = 7.92 ∗ 10−3. (f) Nsm = 50, K = 5.61 ∗ 10−3. (g) Nsm = 100, K = 7.82 ∗ 10−4.
(h) Nsm = 300, K = 7.30 ∗ 10−4. (i) Nsm = 1000, K = 1.66 ∗ 10−4. (j) Nsm = 3000, K = 1.83 ∗ 10−5. (k) Nsm = 5000, K = 8.85 ∗ 10−6.
(l) Nsm = 6287, K = 0.
value (i.e., KT = 5∗10−3) after which further increasing Nsm
has a negligible effect on K. KT can be used as a threshold
value for preserving individual users’ privacy when users’
ACDs are used. In other words, to ensure that the ACD of a
VOLUME 3, 2015 2841
M. A. Mustafa et al.: DEP2SA Scheme in AMI
FIGURE 9. The K-divergence between the ACD distribution of all the users
(i.e., 6287 users) in a dataset and the ACD distributions of random
subsets with varying number of users from the same dataset.
set of users does not leak individual users’ private data (i.e., to
preserve a sufficient level of privacy for the user in the set),
the minimum number of users included in the set should be
such that the resulting K value is lower than KT.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the DEP2SA scheme in terms
of computational complexity imposed on various entities
in the system and the communication overheads incurred
between SMs and the DCC. We also compare the perfor-
mance of DEP2SA with the performances of two state-of-
the-art aggregation schemes: the efficient privacy-preserving
aggregation scheme [8], named as EPPA, and the decentral-
ized security framework [9], named as DSF. As in DEP2SA,
both schemes use homomorphic enctryption technique
(the Paillier cryptosystem) to protect users’ privacy. However,
EPPA aggregates users’ CDs only at BGs, whereas DSF,
similar to DEP2SA, aggregates the data also at NGs andWGs.
A. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Computationally expensive operations used in DEP2SA are
exponentiation operation in Zn2 (EOZ), exponentiation oper-
ation in G (EOG) and pairing operation (PO).
In DEP2SA, and in each time slot, an SM performs one
EOZ to encrypt its user’s CD, and one EOG to sign its mes-
sage; a BG does (Nsm+1) POs to perform a batch verification
of messages from its child SMs and one EOG to sign its
message; similarly, an NG and aWG performs (Nbg+1) POs
and one EOG, and (Nng+1) POs and one EOG, respectively;
DCC performs (NGwg + 1) POs and (Nd + Ns) EOGs to sign
its message for each DNO and supplier.
As EPPA [8] and DSF [9] use a single-recipient system
model, and to meet the functional requirements, in each time
slot, an SM performs three EOZs to encrypt its CD three
times using the homomorphic public keys of three different
recipients (the TSO, its regional DNO and supplier) and three
EOGs to sign three different messages destined to each of
these recipients; a BG does 2(Nsm+ 1) and Ns(NsmNs + 1) POs
to perform batch verifications of the messages destined to the
TSO and DNO, and Ns number of suppliers, respectively, and
TABLE 5. Computation complexity comparison.
(2+ Ns) EOGs to sign (2+ Ns) different messages (to TSO,
DNO and each of the suppliers). As EPPA [8] aggregates
data only at BGs, the computational costs at NGs and WGs
are negligible (the messages are simply forwarded), whereas
DCC performs (NGwgNngNbg(2+Ns)+Nd(1+Ns)+ 1) POs
to verify the messages sent from the BGs and destined to
TSO, DNOs and suppliers, and (Nd + Ns + 1) EOGs to sign
a different message to the TSO, each DNO and each supplier.
As DSF [9] aggregates data also at NGs and WGs, each NG
and WG perform (Nbg + 1)(2 + Ns) and (Nng + 1)(2 + Ns)
POs, and (2+Ns) and (2+Ns) EOGs, respectively, whereas
DCC performs (NGwg(2 + Ns) + Nd(1 + Ns) + 1) POs and
(Nd + Ns + 1) EOGs.
We denote EOZ, EOG and PO as oez, oeg and op, respec-
tively, and summarize the computational complexities of
DEP2SA, EPPA [8] and DSF [9] in Table 5. We have also
conducted experiments with the PBC [44] and MIRACL [45]
libraries on a 3.0 GHz-processor and 4 GB-memory machine
to study the operational costs of EOZ, EOG and PO. The
experimental results show that EOZ (|n2| = 2, 048) costs
84.4 µs, EOG in G with 160 bits 43.5 µs and PO 136.1 µs.
We set Nsm = 268, Nbg = 28, Nng = 32, NGwg = 140 and
Nd = 14, so AMI could cover the entire grid in UK [35].
We depict the variations of computational costs in terms
of Ns (the number of suppliers in a liberalized market)
in Fig. 10. Compared to EPPA [8], DEP2SA has slightly
more computational costs at an NG and a WG (as EPPA only
forwards messages at NGs and WGs), but significantly less
computational costs at a BG, and specifically at the DCC.
Compared to DSF [9], DEP2SA introduces significantly less
computational costs at each entity.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS
The communication overheads introduced by DEP2SA are
largely in four parts: the overhead incurred (1) when SMs
send data to a BG (denoted as SMs-to-BG), (2) when BGs
send data to an NG (BGs-to-NG), (3) when NGs send data
to a WG (NGs-to-WG), and (4) when WGs send data to the
DCC (WGs-to-DCC).
With DEP2SA in each time slot, each SM sends its report,
msgsmi = {IDsmi ‖ IDbgβ ‖ IDdj ‖ csmi ‖ TStn ‖ TSsmi ‖
2842 VOLUME 3, 2015
M. A. Mustafa et al.: DEP2SA Scheme in AMI
FIGURE 10. Computational cost comparison at a BG, NG, WG and DCC. (a) At each BG. (b) At each NG. (c) At each WG.
(d) At the DCC.
FIGURE 11. Communication overhead comparison at the SMs-to-BG, BGs-to-NG, NGs-to-WG and WGs-to-DCC parts. (a) At
each SMs-to-BG part. (b) At each BGs-to-NG part. (c) At each NGs-to-WG part. (d) At the WGs-to-DCC part.
σsmi}, to its local BG. Considering that each BG collects data
from Nsm SMs, the SMs-to-BG communication overhead is
Nsm ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | + |c|). Similarly, each BG sends
only a single message, msgbgβ = {IDbgβ ‖ IDngη ‖ IDdj ‖
(IDs1 ‖ C tnbgβ ,dj,s1 ) ‖ . . . ‖ (IDsNs ‖ C
tn
bgβ ,dj,sNs
) ‖ TStn ‖
TSbgβ ‖ σbgβ }, to its local NG. Considering that each NG
collects data from Nbg BGs, the BGs-to-NG communication
overhead is Nbg ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | +Ns ∗ (|ID| + |C|)).
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TABLE 6. Communication overhead comparison.
FIGURE 12. Communication overhead comparison at the SMs-to-DCC
part.
Similarly, the NGs-to-WG andWGs-to-DCC communication
overheads are Nng ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | +Ns ∗ (|ID| + |C|))
and NGwg∗(3|ID|+2|TS|+|σ |+Ns∗(|ID|+|C|)), respectively.
In contrast to DEP2SA, in EPPA [8] and DSF [9], each SM
sends 3 different messages of the form {IDsmi ‖ IDbgβ ‖
IDr ‖ C tnsmi ‖ TStn ‖ TSsmi ‖ σsmi} to three different
recipients (i.e., r = {dj, tso, su}). Hence, the SMs-to-BG
communication overhead is 3Nsm∗(3|ID|+2|TS|+|σ |+|C|).
Each BG sends (2+Ns) different messages of the same form
to (2+Ns) different recipients (i.e., r = {dj, tso, s1, . . . , sNs}).
Hence, the BGs-to-NG communication overhead is Nbg∗(2+
Ns) ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | + |C|). Similarly, in DSF [9],
the NGs-to-WG andWGs-to-DCC communication overheads
are Nng ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | + |C|) and
NGwg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | + |C|), respectively.
As in EPPA [8] the NGs and WGs simply forward messages
without performing any aggregation, the NGs-to-WG and
WGs-to-DCC communication overheads are NngNbg ∗ (2 +
Ns)∗ (3|ID|+2|TS|+ |σ |+ |C|) and NGwgNngNbg ∗ (2+Ns)∗
(3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ | + |C|), respectively.
The communication overheads introduced by DEP2SA,
EPPA [8] and DSF [9] are summarized in Table 6. Fur-
thermore, using the setting ndj 1024-bit, |ID| and |TS| 32-
bit and G 160-bit long [8], we depict the communica-
tion overheads in terms of Ns in Fig. 11. It can be seen
that DEP2SA introduces less communication overheads than
EPPA and DSF in every communication part. The total
communication overhead between SMs and DCC is shown in
Fig. 12. DEP2SA has significantly less total communication
overhead compared to EPPA [8] and DSF [9].
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel data aggregation
scheme, DEP2SA, that allows grid operators and suppli-
ers to collect users’ aggregated consumption data efficiently
and with user privacy preservation. DEP2SA combines the
use of homomorphic encryption and selective data aggrega-
tion based on the geographic locations of the data source
(i.e., SMs) and the intended recipients of the aggregated data.
As a result, DEP2SA allows authorized entities to access
ACDs of users on the need-to-know basis, i.e., different
authorized entities can only gain access to the ACDs of
the subgroups of users under their respective managements,
thus making the scheme secure in terms of preserving users’
privacy and readily applicable to liberalized electricity mar-
kets. Also, the adoption of a decentralized and progressive
data verification and aggregation model makes the scheme
both computationally and bandwidth-wise efficient. Partic-
ularly, with this approach, the computation complexity is
independent of the number of SMs in the system, thus
making DEP2SA scalable. Analytical and numerical results
have shown that, in comparison to existing related schemes,
DEP2SA offers significant improvements in terms of com-
putational complexity and scalability. Security analysis has
demonstrated that DEP2SA satisfies the security and privacy-
preservation requirements specified, including the principle
of least privilege.
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